Executive Summary
I A guaranteed income (GI) that replaces the welfare state is not currently on the political agenda, but it offers the possibility for a grand compromise that could attract a majority political coalition: for the Left, it represents larger government in that it constitutes a state-driven redistribution of wealth, while for the Right, it offers smaller government in terms of the state's power to control people's lives.
I Any large-scale GI cannot be economically feasible in addition to current welfare programmes.
Financial constraints in both Western Europe and
the United States require that the money for funding a GI comes from the existing Social Security budgets.
I The overarching reason to scrap the apparatus of the welfare state is that the welfare state is self-destructing. After a process that has taken decades, the welfare state has severely degraded the traditions of work, thrift, and neighbourliness which enabled the system to work at the outset.
It is now spawning social and economic problems that it is powerless to solve. I In the United States, a GI of $10,000 per year for all adults aged twenty-one years and older will cost no more than the projected cost of the current system as of 2011. By 2028, it will cost more than a trillion dollars less per year than the projected costs of the current system. I Using conservative assumptions, the proposed GI is demonstrably superior to the current system in enabling the elderly to accumulate comfortable retirement incomes. Furthermore, the proposed GI effectively ends involuntary poverty, even assuming minimum-wage jobs and high unemployment.
I The work disincentive effects of the proposed GI are diminished by a high payback point that begins at US$25,000 of earned income.
The disincentive effects that may result are likely to be concentrated in hours worked rather than the decision to stay in employment.
I The proposed GI may be expected to bring about Guaranteed Income as a Replacement for the Welfare State
Introduction
Professor Amitai Etzioni's policy brief presents a cogent case for a guaranteed income (GI). Like other advocates, he sees the GI as a moral imperativein his case, it is an expression of a moral obligation we have to one another as human beings, rather than as a policy justified by a basic human right.
He shares with many other advocates of a GI the view that it should be given to individuals, not families, and that it should supplement, not replace, means-tested programmes that provide additional services to the poor and other disadvantaged groups.
He distinguishes his approach from many others by invoking the 'communitarian differential', arguing that it is appropriate both ethically and practically to pay more attention to the people in one's immediate community than to people one has never met.
This policy brief also advocates a GI, but from a different political perspective and with different priorities.
Moral obligation or expediency?
While a GI is not on the current policy agenda of any government, it has unique potential in the years to come as the basis for a coalition of supporters from Left and Right. A GI is already attractive on ethical grounds for most people on the Left.
Those on the Right of the political spectrum, including many on the libertarian Right, are already reluctantly convinced that large-scale transfer payments are here to stay, and are consequently receptive to ways of spending the money that does not involve extensive bureaucracies and social engineering. In view of this convergence of views on GI, a grand compromise is potentially available:
for the Left, it represents larger government in that it constitutes a state-driven redistribution of wealth, while for the Right, it offers smaller government in terms of the state's power to control people's lives.
Replace or augment?
From a practical standpoint, Professor Etzioni's arguments for a GI in addition to the existing benefit system are moot. No matter how theoretically persuasive those arguments might be, no Western nation can afford to add a significant GI to its existing commitments. On the contrary, all
Western nations need to restructure their existing benefit systems to avoid bankruptcy. If a GI is to be financially feasible, it must replace existing programmes rather than augment them.
I regard this practical necessity as serendipitous.
The real reason to scrap the advanced welfare state is that its apparatus is outmoded, ineffectual, and often counterproductive. Because this view is so central to the Right's potential support for a GI, some explanation of it is in order.
The European and American welfare states evolved under the twin assumptions that resources were scarce and that government could allocate them effectively. The first assumption was true during the first half of the twentieth century, in the sense that no country had ever been so rich that its wealth, divided evenly among everyone, would provide everyone with a comfortable living. After World War II, in a few countries, wealth increased so much that, for the first time, there was enough money to go around. It was technically possible for no one to be poor. Much of the energy behind the social turmoil of the 1960s was fuelled by this revolutionary change. Now let us consider the second of the assumptions: that governments could allocate resources effectively.
During the early decades of the welfare state, it seemed simple. The indigent elderly depend on charity, so let the government provide everyone with a guaranteed pension. The unemployed husband and father cannot find a job, so let the government give him some useful work to do. Those who are sick cannot afford to go to a private physician, so let the government pay for health care.
It turned out not to be simple after all. The act of giving pensions increased the probability that people reached old age needing them. Governments struggled to find useful work for unemployed people and were ineffectual employers even when they did.
The demand for medical care outstripped the supply. In the United States during the second half of the twentieth century, the welfare state confronted accelerating increases in the number of people who were not just poor, but who behaved in destructive ways that ensured they would remain poor, sometimes living off their fellow citizens, sometimes preying on them: the underclass. As the years passed, poor young men increasingly reached adulthood unprepared to work even when jobs were available. They were more disposed to commit crimes. Poor young women more often bore children without a husband. Poor children more often were born to parents who were incompetent to nurture them. When it came to solving these problems, it was obvious by the 1980s that government had failed. The growing evidence was that government had exacerbated the problems it was trying to solve.
As the Americans were making these discoveries, an underclass also began to emerge in the British and Continental welfare states.
That the apparently straightforward tasks of the welfare state have become complex and underclasses are growing throughout the Western world are neither coincidences nor inevitable by-products of modernity. Over a process that takes decades to play out, the welfare state self-destructs. First, it degrades the traditions of work, thrift, and neighbourliness that enabled the system to work at the outset; then it spawns social and economic problems that it is powerless to solve. Devising an effective replacement for the welfare state is not only a budgetary necessity but also a social imperative.
A specific plan for the United States
To frame the discussion, it is useful to think in terms of a specific proposal. The one I have proposed in a book entitled In Our Hands converts all transfer payments to a single cash payment for everyone aged twenty-one and older (Murray 2006) . It would require an amendment to the American Constitution that I am not competent to frame in legal language, but its sense is easy to express: 'Henceforth, federal, state, and local governments shall make no law nor establish any program that provides benefits to some citizens but not to others. All programs currently providing such benefits are to be terminated. The funds formerly allocated to them are to be used instead to provide every citizen with a cash grant beginning at age twenty-one and continuing until death. The annual value of the cash grant at the program's outset is to be US$10,000.' This version of a GI, does not involve much bureaucracy, besides the administration of a national identity card attesting to citizenship, establishing eligibility for the GI. The grant itself would be electronically deposited in monthly instalments into a bank account established by the recipient (no bank account, no grant). Earned income has no effect on the grant until it reaches US$25,000. From US$25,000 to US$50,000, surtax is 
The financial feasibility of an adequate guaranteed income
Once benefits replacement is used as the basis for financing a GI, the money problem becomes manageable. By about 2011, the GI will be cheaper than maintaining the system the United States has in place, and the cost savings will increase geometrically in the years to come. The cost of the GI will increase as the population increases and ages, at about one per cent per year in total spending (expressed as the compound average growth rate [CAGR] , not the arithmetic average). But total government spending on the programmes the GI replaces will rise much faster. From 1980 to 2000, the annual real increase in the costs of the programmes to be replaced averaged 2.9 per cent, almost three times the rate of increase for the GI. Those increases are about to get larger, as the ageing Baby Boomers generate increases in Social Security and Medicare far larger than those we saw in 1980-2000. Using conservative assumptions, the GI would cost US$549 billion less than a continuation of the current system by 2020.
By 2028, the cost differential would be US$1 trillion per year. This statement does not take transition costs into account, a complex issue that I set aside here except to note that a system that costs a trillion dollars less per year than the current system by 2028 provides options for dealing with transition costs.
Immediate effects 1: retirement income
With regard to the elderly living in retirement, the first and largest advantage of the GI over the current system is that it is truly universal (American Social Security is not), and even in the worst case provides US$10,000 a year for every elderly person in the country. But the GI does more than give everyone a guaranteed floor income. The GI makes it easy for low-income people to have a comfortable retirement. 
Immediate effects 2: health care
The GI requires that every recipient of the grant, beginning at age twenty-one, spends US$3000 of the US$10,000 grant on a health care insurance package that includes coverage for high-cost single events such as surgery and for catastrophic longterm illnesses or disability. The GI also requires that insurance companies treat the entire population as a single risk pool. Given that environment, health insurance companies can offer plans with excellent coverage for somewhere around US$3000. They can be so inexpensive for the same reason that life insurance companies can sell generous life insurance cheaply if people buy it when they are young.
For the rest of the brief, I assume that US$3000 of the grant goes to health care from age twenty-one onward.
I am not wedded to that precise figure, however.
The sense of the proposition is this: determine the cost of a health insurance policy that would pay for extraordinary health care costs, including major surgery, all genetically based diseases, and illnesses involving long-term care or disability. That is the amount of money that I am willing for the government to provide.
If it is determined that the number is US$3800, then the grant should be US$10,800. The arguments in the rest of the paper assume US$7000 remains after health care is deducted. As long as this amount remains constant, the amount devoted to health care is irrelevant. The only effect of tweaking the size of the grant would be to alter the crossover year when the GI is no more costly than the current system. 
Immediate effects 3: poverty among the working-aged

Immediate effects 4: the underclass
The word underclass denotes a class of people who exist at the margins of Western societies. They are usually poor, but poverty is a less important indicator than personal behaviour destructive to themselves and to their communities. Three categories of people constitute a large part of the problem: chronic criminals, never-married women with children, and able-bodied young men who are out of the labour force (Murray 1989) . How might the GI affect them?
Criminality
According to sociological theory that sees crime as a response to economic deprivation, the GI should reduce crime. The GI will provide a nice test of such theories. But the twentieth century provided a nice test, too, and the theories flunked. Poverty fell; crime rose. The GI may indirectly reduce crime through positive effects on family structure, but I will not forecast reduced crime as one of the GI's positive effects. If it happens, it will be a bonus.
Births to single women
The GI will plausibly produce a large reduction in births that occur to single women, for the simplest of reasons: it introduces new penalties for nonmarital births for everyone involved.
The GI obviously increases the economic penalty of having a baby for a single woman under twenty-one, who no longer has access to any of the existing welfare programmes for single mothers. The GI also increases the economic penalty on the parents of a teenaged mother who is still living at home, thereby also increasing their incentives to pressure the daughter to avoid pregnancy or to have an abortion.
Under the GI, having a baby no longer triggers a benefits stream to defray their costs.
have gone from a situation in which they had little incentive to work to a situation in which they have substantial incentives to work.
Empowering the individual
I cannot leave the discussion of effects on the underclass without alluding to a broader effect of the GI that may be the most important of all.
A persuasive critique of the current system is that the people who make up the underclass have no reason to think they can be anything else. The GI says just one thing to people who have never had reason to believe it before: 'Your future is in your hands'. And it is the truth.
Immediate effects 5: work disincentives
The most serious practical objection to the GI is its potential effect on work. For low-income single women aged twenty-one and older, the major effect of the GI is to create a cost of having a baby, since the baby would have to be looked after out of the existing US$10,000 the woman already receives, which contrasts with the current system, where the birth of a baby brings resources that would not be offered if the baby did not exist.
Young males not in the labour market
The third category of people who embody the underclass consists of able-bodied young men in low-income neighbourhoods who do not work or even look for work, and have no excuse for not working (e.g., they are not attending school).
In the United States, even in tight labour markets, these young men account for about 8 per cent of white males and 22 per cent of black males.
The GI complicates their lives by forcing them to have an income that other people know about.
Without the GI, large numbers of young men who live with parents or girlfriends have an active incentive not to work at a low-paying job. Such a job would not pay enough to get a nice place of their own, but any regular income would put them under pressure to help parents or girlfriends pay for food and rent. With the GI being deposited to their bank account every month, they would no longer have the option of avoiding that pressure. But with the grant as a supplement, the income from a low-paying job now makes it feasible to get places of their own.
All those men who would prefer to be independent under the GI? The discussion in In Our Hands works through a variety of scenarios, reaching the following conclusions:
I Most of those who remain out of the labour force will be the same people who are out of the labour force under the current system. I Most of the reductions in work effort will involve fewer hours worked, not fewer people working.
I Most of the people who leave the labour force will be college graduates who take time off between graduation and a permanent job or graduate school.
I The net decrease in work effort will be acceptable.
The key feature of the GI that supports these conclusions is the high income level at which the grant begins to be paid back through the surtax (US$25,000 of earned income). Past attempts to put a floor on income have foundered on high marginal tax rates for people who take low-paying jobs.
Setting the start of the payback of the grant at US$25,000 lures people into working until they are making too much money to quit. The fact that people start paying a few hundred dollars in surtax when they first get past US$25,000 in earned income has no meaningful effect on their calculations about whether to continue working, since at US$25,000 of earned income, they are choosing between a net of US$35,000 versus a net of US$10,000. A work disincentive may well be observed, but it will be concentrated in number of hours worked, not in the choice to work at all. The GI returns those functions and responsibilities to family and community. In this sense, the importance of the GI on human relationships and the vitality of communities is not that each adult has US$10,000 a year, but that the government has withdrawn all the ways in which the apparatus of the welfare state tries to take the trouble out of people's lives, and by that withdrawal has made it easier for people to behave in ways that lead to satisfying lives.
Long-term effects
Regarding marriage, the GI leaves everyone with the option of remaining single and moving in and out of short-term relationships. But most people want something deeper and more lasting than that, something that looks like marriage traditionally defined. Without the apparatus of the welfare state, marriage once again becomes the locus within which a man and woman can make a future together, laden with responsibilities and obligations that cannot be put aside.
Regarding the community, a GI that has replaced the welfare state makes the community once again the locus within which human needs must be met, and the effects could be profound. It is not necessary for everyone to become a volunteer social worker to find satisfaction in life, but it is important that human needs of those in trouble are dealt with in a way that is an integral part of everyone's life. In a society where the responsibility for dealing with human needs is consigned to bureaucracies, a disconnect develops between the recognition of suffering and the ordinary citizen's obligations to deal with it. That disconnect is reflected in everything from the way we teach (or fail to teach) virtue to our children, to the way we allocate our time among the competing needs of family, community, and personal pleasure. The GI removes that disconnect. 
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